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EDITORIAL

IN the course of our propaganda work on behalf of the Central Labour College we have had not only to deal with objections arising out of the difference between Ruskin College and the Central Labour College, but also with objections that arise out of a disregard for this difference, **Some more Objections.** which presuppose both colleges to be essentially the same. These latter critics claim not only that the Central Labour College is superfluous, but that its existence is a source of positive mischief to the Labour Movement. Three points of objection are presented. *First*: No guarantee can be given that the students sent by the organizations will at the end of their period of residence in the college return to the working-class movement and be of service therein. *Second*: So few men can have the opportunity of being trained at the college that it will be easy for the capitalist class to buy them over. *Third*: By taking men away from the sphere of industrial life for one or two years the creation of a clique of "superior persons" is encouraged who will impose upon the rank and file.



Is there any evidence which justifies the raising of these objections? Most certainly there is. But it is not evidence supplied by the Central Labour College. The evidence arises from quarters opposed to the Central Labour College, from institutions of the type of Ruskin College. Indeed when these **What are the Facts?** objections are stated they are actually accompanied by concrete illustrations. Such and such a one went to Ruskin College, and after finishing his term there went into

a Labour Exchange or became a lecturer for the Free Trade bagmen. Another since his return has done nothing save strut about like a turkey on parade in a farmyard. Undoubtedly with respect to Ruskin College and the Workers' Educational Association the illustrations sustaining the objections are correct. But surely there is no justification for judging the Central Labour College from the results of Ruskin College! To do so is to imply that the Central Labour College and Ruskin College are fundamentally the same, is to ignore the fact that they are fundamentally different. Was it not precisely to meet those objections, to prevent such disastrous consequences that the Central Labour College arose? And has not all our criticism been directed to show that these undesirable results are the inevitable products of an institution not founded on the conscious recognition of the class cleavage in society? It should not be a matter for astonishment that the three objections hold good for Ruskin College. The character of the education given there is such that it unfits men for sound and active service to the working class. The principles upon which Ruskin College is based put it at once outside the movement for the emancipation of the working class. Its insistence upon being neutral and non-partizan point at once to the fact that it is in direct contradiction to the very partizan and divided reality, and its aim "to promote good citizenship!" pronounces it to be an agent for the conserver of class-divided society.



It is now admitted by Ruskin College that *it gives a University education*, and that it is the only Labour college that does so. It is quite welcome to the monopoly. But what giving a University education to students selected from the

The Reasons for Failure.

working class means is really that there is no class struggle in society. To say that education is the same for both capitalist and wage-labourer is to say that the interests of both capitalist and wage-labourer are identical. University education for the working class is on the educational field, what Liberalism is for the working class in the political field, and what Conciliation is for the working class in the industrial field. And that is precisely the ground on which Ruskin College stands. And that is why it is not a working-class college. According to the outlook of Ruskin College the working class are unable to emancipate themselves. The working class must have recourse to the intelligence department of the enemy in order to triumph over the enemy. The working class must seek the advice of a Liberal politician with regard to how the relations of wage-labourer and capitalist stand in society. Professor Lees-Smith, advisory member on Ruskin College Council, is Liberal politician one day and Labour emancipator the next. On the Council of

Ruskin College he is the consulting physician of the Labour Movement. In the House of Commons he represents the undertakers of the Labour Movement. Perhaps the Labour Party will be persuaded shortly to appoint the Liberal member for Northampton to the position of advisory agent to them out of admiration for his wisdom in advising Ruskin College Council to refuse representation to the Labour Party.*



THERE is not a single teacher in Ruskin College who has any conception of the wage-workers as a class, or as a class because they are wage-workers. That is to their fantastic mind a brutal conception.

A "Liberal" Education. They soar above such brutality and sordidness. They are all out for the "humane economics" and the "good citizen." A Labour Exchange is for them a "humane institution! A Con-

ciliation Board is a realization of "good citizenship"! These are the results of a "humane" education. As a matter of fact "humane economics" is the retention of the merchandise status of labour-power and "good citizens" are docile slaves. Mr. H. S. Furniss is the teacher of economics at Ruskin College. He is a very "humane" economist. So humane is he that he cannot refrain from occupying the position of President of the Gladstone League and Vice-President of the Young Liberals in Oxford. Liberal legislation and Labour education! Oil and water! If we cannot have a Liberal to legislate for us then for that reason we must not look to a Liberal to educate us for the purpose of fighting Liberalism. The working class must supply its own educational representatives just as it supplies its own political and industrial representatives. And it is just because the working class have realized this truth to a considerable extent upon the two latter fields that an attempt is being made on the educational field to arrest the further progress of the Labour Movement industrially and politically. But it is not succeeding. It will not succeed. The growth and development of the Central Labour College answers the objections raised against educational institutions of the type of Ruskin College by practically removing the conditions which rendered the objections justifiable. The Central Labour College is in and of the working-class movement. It is founded upon a recognition of the conditions of society from which the working-class movement is born and in which it develops. It is conscious of the class interests of the wage labourers and of the antagonism that does and must exist between wage labourers and capitalists. It recognizes above all the indispensable conditions for the elimination of that antagonism. It openly proclaims that the

*At the conference called by Ruskin College at Oxford, in October, 1909, a motion to admit the Labour Party to representation was defeated by 27 votes to 4 on the ground that Ruskin College must be non-partizan and non-political.

emancipation of the working class involves the overthrow of capitalist production. Conscious of all this the Central Labour College does not lend itself to the dangers pointed out in the objections under discussion. It was because these dangers did exist at Ruskin College that the Central Labour College was established. Men who went to Ruskin College went out of the working-class movement and there is small wonder that many did not return. Men who go to the Central Labour College remain in the working-class movement and there is nothing in the working of the College that would encourage them to leave the movement. The nature of the education given is such that men who come to study at the Central Labour College are fitted only for the special work of the Labour movement. They are because of that rendered unfit for any capitalist office or profession. It is where the education given is but skin deep, where men are trained to view society in a distorted way, that they become easily adapted for Free Trade platforms or Labour Exchanges. It is not because the number of students are few that they are easily bought over by capitalist gilt and glamour but because they have been taught a false and superficial view of social conditions, because they have received their economics from a Liberal politician. A sound scientific education is the greatest preventative against the allurements of capitalist jobs. And as for the clique of "superior persons" who would air themselves at the expense of the movement, the whole atmosphere of the Central Labour College is simply dead against such a creation. In a University atmosphere the germs are plentiful. And then again it is the character of the education given that determines. The sphere of University education is one in which the social apothecaries, political pedlars, new messiahs, honest imbeciles and dishonest impostors abound. Society from the point of view of Ruskin College is something that can be cured only by recipes carefully planned and prepared by Jovian professors. They have so much in their head that it is little wonder they lose their heads so often. They stand so continually upon their heads that it is not surprising they should mistake common place for common sense, that *their* ideas should reflect an inverted topsy-turvy world. The Central Labour College is not affiliated to any such institutions as breed this sort of thing. The Central Labour College does not give a University education. It gives a working-class education. It has its feet firmly planted on the movement of material conditions, a basis on which no temple can stand, no priestcraft arise.

W.W.C.

The Penygraig Labour Club, Rhondda Valley, have subscribed the handsome sum of £15 15s. od. to the funds of the College.

The Problem of Knowledge

BY PAUL LAFARGUE

SOME philosophers have questioned the certainty of our knowledge of the external world because, declares Berkeley, the indications furnished by the senses are doubtful, and because the spirit being immaterial cannot perceive material objects. Our knowledge must be subjective: we could know only the ideas which we form for ourselves of things. The quality and the quantity of a thing, the causes which determine it, its modality, its relations to other things, its displacement in space and its succession in time, must be the concepts of our intelligence, forms of our understanding. Causality, space and time must be equally the necessary and universal concepts of our reason, say Hume and Kant. The things of the external world, such as we perceive them, must be the creations of our spirit. We do not know the substance of things, according to Hume; the thing in itself, according to Kant. Things remain unknown and unknowable by us.

Huet, the learned bishop of Avranches, scoffed at Descartes, "this *soi-disant* discoverer of truth," because, after having begun with a laudable prudence, with doubting everything, he loses his way after the second step and affirms everything, then that man can affirm nothing, for he is certain of nothing except the truths revealed by God and taught by His Church. Pyrrhonian scepticism, theological argument! We met with it again playing this rôle with Charron, the fiery preacher of the League: it was according to him, "a great preparation" for the faith; in order to "plant and impose Christianity on an apostate and infidel people, it would be a very good way to begin with these propositions and persuasions that the world is altogether worn out, rent asunder, and debased with fantastic opinions, forged in its own brain; that God has well created man to know the truth, but that he cannot know of himself, nor by any human means, and that it is necessary that God Himself, in whose bosom it resides, and Who makes the desire of it to be born in man, should reveal it as He has done." *

Pascal comes, however, and banishes the certainty of his last refuge; the truth revealed by God.

" . . . The main contentions of the Pyrrhonians are that we have no certainty of truth outside faith and revelation; . . . since there is no certainty outside faith whether man has been created by a good God, by a wicked demon, or by chance, it is in doubt, according to what our origin may have been, whether these principles (of certainty) given us are true, or false, or uncertain.

* Charron, *Discours chrétiens*, 1600. The method is good. Kant and others have followed it to return to Christianity; Socrates and Pyrrho had applied it to make use of the Pagan polytheism, for, says the ardent Catholic of the 16th century, "with doubt there will never be heresies and picked, particular, extravagant opinions; neither Pyrrhonian nor Academican will ever be heretical, these are things opposed."

" . . . What will man do in this state? Will he doubt every thing? Will he doubt if he is pinched? if he is burned? Will he doubt if he doubts? Will he doubt if he is? We cannot come to that point; and I assert that there has never been a real perfect Phyrhronism" (Pensées VIII, § 1).

Some philosophers have affirmed the reality of our knowledge. The idealist Hegel asserts that if we know all the qualities of a thing, we know the thing in itself; there remains further only the fact that the said thing exists outside itself, and when the senses have learned this fact, we have grasped the last remnant of the thing in itself, the unknowable *Ding an sich* of Kant. The Socialist Engels refutes this as an economist: "In the time of Kant, our knowledge of the objects of nature was so fragmentary, that he could believe himself in the right in supposing—beyond the little that we knew of each of them, a mysterious *thing in itself*. But these ungraspable things have been grasped one after another, analysed, and what is more, reproduced, thanks to the gigantic advances of science; what we can produce, we cannot pretend to consider as unknowable.*

Commonplace mortals are not tormented by such doubts, if they know that the senses often deceive them; the philosophers with scruples as to the certainty of our understanding are not more so, when they come down from the regions of pure reason and of metaphysical speculation into the world of reality. The learned ignore them when they study the phenomena of nature. Nevertheless since the renaissance of Kantism, there are men of science who are disturbed by such doubts. Made impatient, rather than troubled by these doubts, they send them packing, and, with Gustave le Bon, they declare that science has not to busy itself with things in themselves, that is to say, with the noumena of the philosophers, and to oppose them to appearances, that is to say, to the phenomena revealed by our sensations. The refractions created by our senses being almost the same for all minds built on the same model, science can consider them as realities, and construct its building with them. . . . It concerns it little to know if the world such as we perceive it is real or unreal. It accepts it as it appears and endeavours to adapt itself thereto. Our perceptions are proportioned to ourselves and interest us only because they are proportioned to ourselves." † Le Bon puts aside the Kantian doubt, but he does not contest it; on the contrary, he recognizes it. Felix le Dantec attacks it as a naturalist, and deals it a mortal blow: "The fact that we are alive and that our species has not disappeared is sufficient to allow us to affirm that our knowledge of the external world is not deceptive, and that it concerns all those surrounding accidents which have a share in the preservation of our existence." ‡

* F. Engels, *Religion, philosophie, socialisme*. Library of the Socialistic Party.

† G. Le Bon. *Edification de la connaissance scientifique*, Revue scientifique, 1er février 1908.

‡ F. Le Dantec, *les Sensations et le monisme scientifique*. Rev. Sci., 20 février 1904.

The doubt as to the certainty of our knowledge, which for more than two thousand years has engrossed human thought, which has acquired so great a philosophic importance, and which is in recrudescence since the revival of Kantism—is one of the problems which the philosophy of sciences ought to solve.

I propose to myself in this article to review its historic origins and determining causes, and to try to give an explanation and refutation thereof.

* * *

The problem of knowledge has been stated by the sophists of ancient Greece with a logical boldness which modern philosophers who have restored it to discussion never had. They questioned and put in doubt the perceptions which come to us by way of the senses and did not respect the concepts of pure Reason.

They said, the senses do not inform us exactly: an oar plunged into water appears broken; the moon seems to lessen in size in proportion as it rises on the horizon; a round tower becomes flat seen at a distance; the trees of an alley approach one another in proportion as we go away farther from one of its extremities; a scent agreeable to the smell offends the taste; a painting which has relief to the sight has not to the touch; for him who is on a vessel in motion the hills of the bank move; a ball rolled between the forefinger and the middle finger which is crossed on the forefinger gives the sensation of two balls, &c.

The senses furnish not only erroneous, but dissimilar impressions according to individuals and according to the moods of the same individual: a certain scent pleasant to one is unpleasant to another; honey appears sweet to some, and bitter to others; Democritus assumed that it is neither sweet nor bitter, and Heraclitus, that it has these two qualities; we are cold when, in winter, we go to a banquet and hot when we go out from it, &c.

Objects being known to us only by our sensations, we can say how they appear to us and not at all how they are. What right, contended Ænesidemus, is there to suppose that our perceptions are more conformed to the nature of things than those of animals; the animals which have the eyeball elongated ought to have another perception than we; touch is not the same for that which is clothed with a shell, scales, or feathers. The diversity of sensations is attested by facts: oil, good for man, kills wasps and bees; hellebore, mortal poison for man, fattens quails and goats; the water of the sea, the condition of life for fishes, is harmful to man who stops too long therein, &c.

Since we have knowledge of things only by our sensations, concludes Aristippus, the disciple of Socrates, we cannot know if they have the qualities which impress us; we have sensations of the soft, white, hot, but we are ignorant whether the objects which cause them are soft, white, or hot.

Protagoras, the genial sophist, whose opinions we know, unfortunately, only by some short citations, said: If the eye is blind when there is no coloured object which impresses it, the object is without colour as long as there is no eye to perceive it, thus no object is or becomes in itself or for itself, that which it is or becomes is only for the individual who perceives it, and he perceives it, naturally, differently according to the state in which he finds himself. Things are only for each man what they appear to him, and they appear only as they ought to appear to him according to his own state; in consequence "*Man is the measure of all things*, of those which are and of those which are not, as far as it is to be known that they are not." There is no objective truth, but only a subjective appearance of truth.

The celebrated aphorism of Protagoras is the whole subject-matter of subjective philosophy, the philosophy of the Bourgeoisie, the individualist class, par excellence, whose individuals measure everything according to their interests and passions.*

The sophist did not doubt his own sensations any more than Descartes his thought: he was certain that he lived, saw the light, smelt the perfume of the rose; he did not doubt that the rose appeared scented to him and the snow white; but he did not know if the rose had scent and the snow whiteness; he was equally ignorant if the rose and the snow produced exactly the same sensation upon others; probably not, since their state was different; how then could he be certain that the same things appeared alike to all men. The same words, observed he, are used to express unlike sensations; when two men pretend to experience the same sensation, neither of them is certain that the sensation of the other is like his own, for he feels only according to his own state and not according to that of the other. We can neither know things nor communicate to another the impressions which they produce on our senses; we exchange words and not sensations. Consequently there is no knowledge valid for all, since all knowledge rests only on sensations; there are only opinions, declares Protagoras, and there is no opinion true and valid for all.

* Kant resumes the thesis of the Greek sophists, as to the inability of the senses to furnish a knowledge of things. "A phenomenon," says he, "is something which needs not be sought in the object in itself, but always in the relation of this object to the subject, which is inseparable from the representation which we have of it. When I attribute to the rose in *itself* redness; and to all external objects extent *in themselves*, without having regard to the determined relation of these objects to the subject and without restricting my judgment in consequence, it is then that illusion is born." *Critique de la Raison pure*, 2^e § 8, translation by Barni.

He had said, in a suppressed passage of the first edition: "The pleasing taste of wine does not belong to the objective properties of wine, that is to say, to the properties of an object as such, but to the particular nature of the sense of the subject which enjoys it. Colours are not the qualities of the bodies to which they are related, but only of the modifications of the sense of sight, affected by the light in a certain way." *Ibid*, 1^{re} section, § 4.

The sophists, consequently, professed that the individual ought not to accept current opinions without examination, even when they have been bequeathed by their ancestors; that each man ought to make his own opinions himself, to recognize as true only what appears to him true, and to attach value only to that which obtains his conviction and offers to him some personal interest. They lay in a fashion the bases of a new philosophy, where, as Hegel observes, the principle of subjectivity ought to predominate. They prepared for its coming by becoming public teachers; they taught that what was useful would come to pass and foretold the abandonment of researches as to the nature of things, to which primitive philosophy had devoted itself, because they brought no profit.

The Church, also, has uttered its thunders against the physical sciences, those inventions of Satan. The sophists and the Church represent fortuitously the spirit of the Bourgeoisie, which, seeking only profit in everything, has encouraged the study of the phenomena of Nature only when it has been proved to it that the knowledge of natural forces and their industrial application were an inexhaustible source of riches.

Socrates, the most illustrious of the sophists, according to Grotius, contributed, more than all others, to put in trim the subjective philosophy and its definitive separation from all science: he took for a point of departure of his teaching not the knowledge of things, but the knowledge of oneself, the knowledge of one's Ego. Plato, in the *Phaedo*, shows him disposed to explain the world by man; contrarily to primitive philosophy, which, by its direction and its content, was the philosophy of nature, and which sought to explain man by the world.

Socrates asked of the sciences only what was immediately useful to practical life; from geometry, what was needed to measure the fields, from astronomy, just what was needed "to know the hours of the night, the days of the month, and the Seasons of the year." Xenophon reports that, "far from seeking the causes of celestial phenomena, he demonstrated the folly of those who gave themselves up to such speculations. Those who learn a trade, said he, hope to exercise it finally for themselves and for others; those who seek to penetrate the secrets of the gods (that is to say, the the mysteries of Nature), do they believe that, when they know well the causes of everything which is, they will make at their pleasure and according to their needs, the winds, the rain, the seasons, and other like things? or without flattering themselves with so much power, is it sufficient for them to know how that acts?" (*Memoirs of Socrates*, liv. I).

(*To be continued*).

Translated from the French for the "*Plebs*" Magazine by
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Syndicalism

OUR friend Lyle's article in January, "*Plebs*"—"Industrial Action and Political Reaction"—is very interesting. One is almost tempted to say that "ancient" and "antiquated" mean the same thing so far as his arguments are concerned. I do not think I shall be doing him an injustice if I reduce his conclusions to the following:—

1. That all political action is reactionary *because* it cannot *alone* bring about the emancipation of Labour.
2. That all working-class political parties have proved failures.
3. That socialist political parties are no longer feared by the master class.
4. That only the General Strike can bring about the social revolution (Socialism or Communism, whichever he prefers. I am not aware of any difference between the two).
5. That the General Strike would destroy for all time the Capitalist State's armed forces.
6. That the General Strike is a hammer; capable of breaking and making.
7. That all former Revolutions have been made by (or on) empty stomachs.

I intend to try and answer these points. For the purpose of economizing your valuable space I shall quote each point numerically.

1.—All political action must be judged according to the "material at hand, with the stage of enlightenment that the masses have reached, and that under the existing circumstances could be immediately used." Judged by this alone the forcing of the Trades Dispute Bill on a Capitalist Parliament by our own Labour Party is a proof of the fallacy of the first conclusion. Lyle may say we could have got it by industrial action. True! But the "could" in that case must be turned into "would." I, personally, do not think the stage of development of the workers in 1907 was such that they would have struck work as a body to obtain the reversal of the Taff Vale Decision. He may even say that the Trades Dispute Bill achieved nothing. It may be so. But would the industrial organization of the workers have developed as it has done—with the same rapidity—without the sense of freedom to take action industrially that the Trades Dispute Bill gave? It is not the effect on the revolutionary element among the workers we have to think of in this case, but those of the workers, unfortunately an immense majority, who are surfeited with capitalist notions of "law and order." Freedom to take action, and the participation in action, such as a strike, make workers revolutionary, *without* that sense of acting within their legal rights they would probably remain many

more years under the spell of capitalist thought, if not for the remainder of their life. Who are the men hardest to move in industrial or political matters? Those who are getting on in years, who are "full up" with old traditional notions of "the rights of the employer." Yet we know that almost always they stand to gain most by protective and aggressive working-class action. Unfortunately it is not what advanced workers *know* or *think* that influences these people to action, but rather what *they* think. If anything will make them think at all it is action, but, as has been proved on many occasions, *they* won't take action, if they think it "illegal." Facts have to be looked in the face. Having broken Lyle's reasoning in one place, and it could be further demolished, if necessary, on the above lines and on actual history, his "all political action is reactionary," is proved false.

2 & 3.—The above has practically answered the first point, but I would add this: because one form of political activity has not been so effective as it might have been, it does not prove that *all* political activity is bound to be spineless, or to fail. It would be just as valid to reason that because Trade Unionism is now ineffective, that therefore *all* industrial activity is ineffective, as a matter of fact, this has practically been the form of argument by some types of Socialists for years. They are, or have been, political Lyles. I, personally, think it too absurd to argue this proposition: the German Socialist movement has proved a failure. The present stage of development of the masses in Germany have amply justified the work of the German Social Democrats. On the score of point three again, I would "produce" the German Social Democrats. Lyle has forgotten "our own country" also in 1906. The Labour Party was certainly feared as a result of that Parliamentary election (though not a Socialist party). Would Lyle like to say how much money was subscribed to all sorts of capitalist movements to beguile the workers from the Labour Party in those days? So soon as it was found that it was simply "a lath painted to look like steel," the streams of gold dried up. We venture to say that a really revolutionary Socialist Political Party would make the streams to flow again. Need we say that *fear* causes the capitalist class to part with its "hard-earned wealth" in this way? Finally, the names of the "political betrayers" of the working class given by Lyle are not convincing argument. First, in what way has Ramsay Macdonald "sold" the workers? Differences of opinion as to the policy to be pursued by Labour men ought not to cause us to make charges which cannot be proved. Again, Pablo Iglesias' condemnation rests solely on the charge brought against him by anarchists—definitely printed by a German anarchist, Roller, in a pamphlet called *The Social General Strike*. We happen to know that American anarchists have been called upon time after time to justify Roller's charges, repeated by them, and have failed to do so. Lyle's charge

appears to emanate from the same source—indeed all the names he mentions seem to have been borrowed from Roller's pamphlet, except Burns, Shackleton, and Macdonald. Anyway, can Lyle produce his evidence against Macdonald, Vandervelde, and Pablo Iglesias? Even were he to succeed in establishing his charges, it would not prove his point. Industrial leaders have accepted lucrative posts before now without doing so *via* Parliament. That proves nothing against the value of industrial organization however. As to political probity let me but mention three names, of very differing political Socialist types, but MEN—Bebel, Hardie, Hervé. I have kept to a selection from Socialists who have been in Parliament, or its equivalent abroad.

4, 5 & 6.—Is the General Strike to be understood as meaning the Social General Strike? If the Social Revolution has to wait for the S.G.S. it will never "arrive." What is the form of the constructive "hammer" of our Syndicalist? The S.G.S. is destructive; true enough. But what is its constructive power? Our friend Lyle's analogy is not good, e.g., a hammer can break a mirror-glass, can it make a mirror-glass? It can break a head, can it make the head whole again ("rebuild it nearer the heart's desire")? or to take his own example, "it can break a table." Yes, it can do that in the hands of anyone endowed with physical strength, *but* suppose it were used for that purpose by a miner, bricklayer, weaver, or "idle" capitalist, could any or all of them competently use the hammer to **MAKE** a table? If our friend Lyle thinks so he knows little of the woodworker's art, or craft. Similarly with industrial organization. A combination of Trade Unions could, equally as well as syndicalized Trade Unions, bring capitalism to a standstill. In what way does Syndicalism improve the shining hour once it has stopped the social productive wheels? If they prepare the workers to carry on production independently of the capitalist class, why the Social General Strike? For it presupposes sufficient organization to stop production, therefore sufficient to carry on production. If this carrying on of production is arranged for by Syndicalism it will certainly bring about the Social Revolution, and thus abolish the armed forces of Capitalism. But again, why the crude, cumbersome, and painful Social General Strike? The Social General Strike is the hammer to make a wooden table in the hands of—the Village Blacksmith.

7.—All past Revolutions may have been brought about by empty stomachs, but there still remained the aching voids the Revolutions did not fill. Pardon, Lyle! *it* was tempting. If Syndicalism, through the weapon of the Social General Strike, is going to leave us at the mercy of the slum proletariat's "taking ways," "the chance of (this B)-lunder alone would be sufficient to ensure that" it has a miss-in-baulk.

In conclusion. Friend Lyle's peroration is meaningless—as a distinction in aims of Syndicalism over *all* political Socialist parties. He makes the error of, by inference, too free a use of the "all." There are political Socialist parties, e.g., all real Marxian Socialist parties, who are not "nationalizers" or believers in State Socialism. Some political parties are not invalidated by even the Carlyle quotation—*it* does not necessarily debar belief in political action. Finally, an Industrial Unionist can, and usually does, believe in political action, and can "produce the goods" for his beliefs in both the political and industrial movements as means towards the abolition of wage-slavery and class-rule.

F. J. C.

Wages and Prices

"THE value of a commodity being determined by the cost of production: value and price being exchangeable terms: wages being a part of the cost of production; will not an advance in wages mean an advance in prices"? Thus a Marxian (?) Socialist to a propagandist of Industrial Unionism recently. Our friend Robertson in his recent article in the *Magazine* (November, 1911,) on "Political and Industrial Action" wrote: "the masters get their own back by . . . increasing the cost of living." Both of these assumptions are based on the belief that: a rise in wages means a rise in prices. The first, couched in scientific language it has a plausibility more apparent than real, is based on the silent assumption that: wages, and socially necessary labour-time (which constitutes value) are convertible terms. The second is based on the belief that: the capitalist class can fix the prices of commodities. The Marxian (?) and Robertson arrive at the same conclusion, though by different routes. Both are in error. We intend to prove this latter statement by quotations from the works of Marx and Engels, leaving further proof to follow the discussion which it is hoped this article will arouse. We shall commence by defining the terms used above: commodity, wages, cost of production, value, price.

Commodity, a use-value: a product of labour privately produced for social consumption, subject to competition between the sellers, and of which the quantity can be increased within reasonable limits. That is, all goods produced for exchange on the market, *except* the products of which an individual or company have a monopoly.

Wages: The price of labour-power, paid by the capitalist to its owner, the labourer. Labour-power is a commodity, and like all commodities its price is determined by its cost of production, in other words, the amount of food, clothing, shelter, &c., required to produce, develop, maintain and perpetuate labour-power. The value of labour-power, therefore, resolves itself into a definite quantity of

the means of subsistence. It varies with the value of those means or with the quantity of labour requisite for their production. On the other hand, the number and extent of the labourer's so-called necessary wants, as also the modes of satisfying them, are themselves the product of historical development, and depend therefore to a great extent on the degree of civilization of a country, more particularly on the conditions under which, and consequently on the habits and degree of comfort in which, the class of wage-labourers has been formed. In contradistinction, therefore, to the case of other commodities, there enters into the determination of the value of labour-power an historical and moral element. Nevertheless, in a given country, at a given period, the average quantity of the means of subsistence necessary for the labourer is practically known.

Cost of Production: At any given period a minimum amount of capital is necessary to the person who would enter the ranks of commodity-producers (capitalists). This capital is embodied in such things as: premises, machinery, raw and auxiliary materials, labour-power (wages). These values enter wholly or partly into the produced commodity, *but* with this distinction, while all the agents of production—except labour-power—merely re-appear in the produced commodity as *transferred* values, labour-power is *transformed* into newly created and expanded values. This process will be explained later.

Value: the quantity of socially necessary labour worked up or crystallized in a commodity. By this is meant the quantity of labour necessary for its production in a given state of society, under certain social average conditions of production, with a given social average intensity, and average skill of the labour employed, measured by time. This does not mean that equal numbers of hours worked, irrespective of the kind of labour, produce equal values. Social labour time is expressed in terms of simple labour through the medium of the price or money form. An arbitrary illustration of this would be, 10 hours of complex labour at 1/- per hour, equals 20 hours of simple labour at 6d. per hour.

Price: taken by itself, is nothing but the monetary expression of value. The values of all commodities are expressed in terms of gold and silver. We exchange a certain amount of our commodities, in which a certain amount of our national labour is crystallized, for the produce of the gold and silver producing countries, in which a certain amount of their labour is crystallized. It is in this way, in fact by barter, that we learn to express in gold and silver the values of all commodities. By this process equal quantities of social labour obtain an independent and common expression. Price, as a monetary expression of value, has been called *natural price*. But natural price (value) and *market price* may differ, in fact generally do. Competition in the market between sellers of similar commodities, and between buyers and sellers, has the effect of adjusting prices to,

(1) the actual amount of socially necessary labour required for the *re*-production of commodities at the period of sales, (2) the relations between supply and demand. Taken over a period the fluctuations in prices caused by the latter compensate one another and adjust price to value.

Labour-power is, in our present-day capitalist society, a commodity like every other commodity, but yet a very peculiar commodity. It has, namely, the peculiarity of being a value creating force, the source of value, and, moreover, when properly treated, the source of more value than it possesses itself. In the present state of production, human labour-power not only produces in a day a greater value than it itself possesses and costs; but with each new scientific discovery, with each new technical invention, there also rises the surplus of its daily production over its daily cost, while as a consequence there diminishes that part of the working day in which the labourer produces the equivalent of his day's wages, and, on the other hand, lengthens that part of the working day in which he must present labour *gratis* to the capitalist.

Now what takes place after the worker has sold his labour-power, i.e., after he has placed his labour-power at the disposal of the capitalist for stipulated wages—whether time wages or piece wages? The capitalist takes the labourer into his work-shop or factory, where all the articles required for the work can be found—raw materials, auxiliary material, tools and machines. Here the worker begins to toil. His daily wages are, say, three shillings; and it makes no difference whether he earns them as day-wages or piece-wages. We will assume that in twelve hours, the working day, the worker adds by his labour a new value of six shillings to the value of the raw materials consumed, which new value the capitalist realizes by the sale of the finished piece of work. Out of the new value he pays the worker his three shillings and the remaining three shillings he keeps himself. If, now, the labourer creates in 12 hours a value of six shillings, in six hours he creates a value of three shillings. Consequently, after working six hours for the capitalist the labourer has returned to him the equivalent of the three shillings received as wages. After six hours' work both are quits, neither one owing a penny to the other.

"Hold on there!" now cries out the capitalist. "I have hired the labourer for a whole day, for twelve hours. But six hours are only half a day. So work along lively there until the other six hours are at an end—only then will we be even." And, in fact, the labourer has to submit to the conditions of the contract upon which he entered of "his own free will," and according to which he bound himself to work twelve whole hours for a product of labour which cost only six hour's labour.

Similarly with piece-wages. Let us suppose that in twelve hours our worker makes twelve commodities. Each of these cost two shillings in raw materials and wear and tear, and is sold for 2½

shillings. On our former assumption, the capitalist gives the labourer one-fourth of a shilling for each piece, which makes a total of three shillings for the twelve pieces. To earn this the worker requires twelve hours. The capitalist receives 30 shillings for the twelve pieces; deducting 24 shillings for raw material and wear and tear, there remains six shillings, of which he pays three shillings in wages and pockets the remaining three. Just as before! Here also the worker labours six hours for himself, i.e., to replace his wages (half an hour in each of the twelve) and six hours for the capitalist.

Since the capitalist and workman have only to divide this limited value, that is, the value measured by the total labour of the working man, the more one gets the less will the other get, and vice versa. Whenever a quantity is given, one part of it will increase inversely as the other decreases. If the wages change, profits will change in an opposite direction. If the wages fall, profits will rise; and if wages rise, profits will fall. If the working man, on our former supposition, gets three shillings, equal to one half of the value he has created, or if his whole working day consists of half of paid, half of unpaid labour, the rate of profit will be 100 per cent., because the capitalist would also get three shillings. If the working man receives only two shillings, or works only one third of the whole day for himself, the capitalist will get four shillings, and the rate of profit will be 200 per cent. If the working man receives four shillings, the capitalist will only receive two, and the rate of profit would sink to 50 per cent., but all these variations will not affect the value of the commodity. A general rise in the wages would, therefore, result in a fall of the general rate of profit, but not affect values. But although *the values of commodities, which must ultimately regulate their market prices, are exclusively determined by the total quantities of labour fixed in them, and not by the division of that quantity into paid and unpaid labour*, it by no means follows that the values of the single commodities, or lots of commodities, produced during twelve hours, for example, will remain constant. The number or mass of commodities produced in a given time of labour, or by a given quantity of labour, depends upon the productive power of the labour employed, and not upon its extent or length. With one degree of the productive power of spinning labour, for example, a working day of twelve hours may produce twelve pounds of yarn, with a lesser degree of productive power only two pounds. If then twelve hours average labour were realized in the value of six shillings in the one case, the twelve pounds of yarn would cost six shillings, in the other case the two pounds of yarn would also cost six shillings. One pound of yarn would, therefore, cost 6*d.* in the one case, and three shillings in the other. The difference of price would result from the difference in the productive powers of the labour employed. One hour of labour would be realized in one pound of yarn with the greater productive power, while with the smaller productive power, six hours of labour would be realized in one pound of yarn. The price of a pound of yarn would, in the one instance,

be only sixpence, although wages were relatively high and the rate of profit low ; it would be three shillings in the other instance, although wages were low and the rate of profit high. This would be so because the price of the pound of yarn is regulated by the total amount of labour worked up in it, and not by the proportional divisions of that total amount into paid and unpaid labour. The fact that Marx has before mentioned that high-priced labour may produce cheap, and low priced labour may produce dear commodities, loses, therefore its paradoxical appearance. It is only the expression of the general law that the value of a commodity is regulated by the quantity of labour worked up in it, and that the quantity of labour worked up in it depends altogether upon the productive powers of the labour employed, and will, therefore, vary with every variation in the productivity of labour.

As we suppose that no change whatever has taken place either in the productive powers of labour, or in the amount of capital and labour employed, or in the value of the money wherein the values of products are estimated, but only a change in the rate of wages, how could that rise of wages affect the prices of commodities? Only by affecting the actual proportion between the demand for, and the supply of, these commodities.

It is perfectly true that, considered as a whole, the working class spends, and must spend, its income upon necessaries. A general rise in the rate of wages would, therefore, produce a rise in the demand for, and consequently in the market prices of, necessaries. The capitalists who produce these necessaries would be compensated for the rise in wages by the rising market prices of their commodities. But how with the other capitalists who do not produce necessaries? And you must not fancy them a small body. If you consider that two-thirds of the national produce are consumed by one-tenth of the population you will understand what an immense proportion of the national produce must be produced in the shape of luxuries, or be exchanged for luxuries, and what an immense amount of necessaries themselves must be wasted upon flunkeys, horses, cats, and so forth, a waste we know from experience to become always much limited with the rising prices of necessaries.

Well, what would be the position of those capitalists who do not produce necessaries? For the fall in the rate of profit, consequent upon the general rise of wages, they could not compensate themselves by a rise in the price of their commodities, because the demand for those commodities would not have increased. Their income would have decreased, and from this decreased income they would have to pay more for the same amount of higher-priced necessaries. But this would not be all. As their income had diminished, they would have less to spend upon luxuries, and therefore their mutual demand for their respective commodities would diminish. Consequently upon this diminished demand the prices of their

commodities would fall. In these branches of industry therefore, the rate of profit would fall, not only in simple proportion to the general rise in the rate of wages, but in the compound ratio of the general rise of wages, the rise in the prices of necessaries, and the fall in the prices of luxuries.

What would be the consequence of this difference in the rates of profit for capitals employed in the different branches of industry? Why, the consequence that generally obtains whenever, from whatever reason, the average rate of profit comes to differ in different spheres of production. Capital and labour would be transferred from the less remunerative to the more remunerative branches; and this process of transfer would go on until the supply in the one department of industry would have risen proportionately to the increased demand, and would have sunk in the other departments according to the decreased demand. This change effected, the general rate of profit would again be equalized in the different branches. As the whole derangement originally arose from a mere change in the proportion of the demand for, and supply of, different commodities, the cause ceasing, the effect would cease, and prices would return to the former level and equilibrium. Instead of being limited to some branches of industry, the fall in the rate of profit consequent upon the rise of wages would have become general. According to our supposition, there would have taken place no change in the productive powers of labour, nor in the aggregate amount of production, but that given amount of production would have changed its form. A greater part of the produce would exist in the shape of necessaries, a lesser part in the shape of luxuries, or what comes to the same, a lesser part would be exchanged for foreign luxuries, and be consumed in its original form, or what again comes to the same, a greater part of the native produce would be exchanged for foreign necessaries instead of for luxuries. The general rise in the rate of wages would, therefore, after a temporary disturbance of market prices, only result in a general fall of the rate of profit without any permanent change in the prices of commodities.

If the surplus wages were, on the contrary, spent upon articles formerly not entering into the consumption of the working men, the real increase of their purchasing power would need no proof.

As children might, impatient of the school,
 Despise the letters, longing for the songs
 And stories that they catch the echoes of.
 The songs are written, but first learn to spell!
 The books will keep,—but if we will not learn,
 We shall not read them when the right time comes,
 Or read them wrongly and confused.

H. E. HAMILTON KING.

Correspondence

MORE FACTS

TO THE EDITOR.

SIR,—It was with great interest I read "Brumaire's" note in last month's "*Plebs*" re my contention that Karl Marx "does not give a clue to the theory of cognition, the nature of the human faculty of thought." I am only very sorry to have to point out that he does me a gross injustice in saying that my authority for such a position is Untermann. I referred to the essay in question simply as a statement of the problem, which, at best, gives but an impetus to investigate the subject more fully. The very fact that I have always refused to use one single proposition from the said document shows the real value I have received therefrom. How, therefore, he could have construed such to be the background to my conceptions I can only understand, by its utility to him, as an apology for introducing the critique of George Plechanoff. In his note he says "the shortcomings of Marx could, and should, be proved from his writings," I agree. But so should qualities of achievement, and how Marx achieved the solution of the problem, the nature of the human faculty of thought, is most conspicuous in his epistle by its absence. Even the extract he gives from Engels throws no light on the real facts of the subject. To say with Engels, "We conceived of *ideas as materialistic*, as pictures of real things. . . . Thereupon the reasoning became reduced to knowledge of the universal laws of motion." This simply means that the data of mind life can be explained by the laws of motion. A most ridiculous contention. Engels definition of Materialist dialectics in *Landmarks of Scientific Socialism* is no better. "The science of the universal laws of motion, and evolution in nature, human society and thought."—p. 173. Such wide generalizations give us no special knowledge on the special subject at issue. Let it be perfectly understood we are now dealing with materialist dialectics not as applied to human society only, but the contention that it is applicable for all investigation. And logically, it is but the old contention that materialism is the best system of thought to explain the whole facts of existence. A term covering all-comprehensive realities. Now, as it is becoming a common platitude to talk of "material monism," let me say that monism—a unitary conception of existence—can neither be prefaced with the term material or spiritual. As a principle it is a solution to the shortcomings of both. It needs little acumen to understand how a system of thought which limits itself to the material element of the object, is bound to fall short in its explanations of all world phenomena. A few moments perusal of my comparisons of the position of Lester Ward with that of Dietzgen should be sufficient to clear the issue. In fact under a system of materialist philosophy you are unable to formulate answers correctly to the problems evolved in the science of psychology. For instance: Pains, pleasures, sensations, perceptions and thoughts are realities existing in real and actual creatures. They do not hover in empty space. But they are not material things. Not being material things they

are unexplainable by the material element alone. (Note the difference between matter and reality). Idealism, limiting itself as it does to the sphere of subjective perception alone, is also most hopeless to account for the facts of reality. In monism I find a bridge over the chasm between the subjective and the objective. This bridge I obtained from a study of Dietzgen's work. To me, in the words of Comrade Craik in July "*Plebs*," he "solved the problem of understanding, and to have as a result stripped the human faculty of thought of its fantastic garb." Having done this, I think we are in duty bound to recognize his services, not as an elucidator of an old theory, but the originator of a new, and one that gives most satisfaction.

Yours for truth,

Northumberland.

EBBY EDWARDS.

DEAR SIR,—In reply to my friend Edwards. "The clue to the theory of cognition, the nature of the human faculty of thought" is supplied in the article he mentions: "As a Matter of Fact." The qualities of achievement are easily followed by reading *Feuerbach*, particularly (on this point) Chapter iv. He says the quotation "*simply* means that the data of mind-life can be explained by the laws of motion. A most ridiculous contention!" Engels is again as ridiculous in the definition of materialist dialectics in *Landmarks of Scientific Socialism*. Well! Well! It has come to this! Poor Engels! Poor Marx! And yet, Dietzgen says approvingly: "According to modern natural science all existence is resolved into motion. It is well known now that even rocks do not stand still, but are continuously active, growing and decaying." "The understanding, the intellect, is an active object, or an objective action, the same as sun-shine, the flow of waters, growing of trees, disintegration of rocks, or any other natural phenomenon," p. 377. So the Universal Philosopher, and the Universal Philosophy, are alike reduced to the ridiculous—by our friend Edwards.

Again, *materialist dialectics* is "logically (!) but the *old* contention that *materialism* is the best system of thought to explain the whole facts of existence"—according to Edwards. Nobody but our friend Edwards is capable of such a "logical" assumption. What materialism is here meant? The inference of course is, *that* materialism which Marx, Engels and Dietzgen have all called "mechanical." Edwards can surely never have read *Feuerbach*, or even the quotation from Marx's *The Holy Family*, contained in Engels', *Historical Materialism*, to say nothing of the author's prefaces to *Capital*, vol. i, and chapter 1.

"It needs little acumen to understand how a system of thought, which *limits itself to the material* element of the object is bound to fall short of all world-phenomena. A few moments perusal of my comparisons of the position of Lester Ward with that of Dietzgen should be sufficient to clear the issue." Now we have it! The materialism of Ward and Marx are of the same brand! How enlightening! And friend Edwards calls himself a student of Marx! We live and learn—though 'tis difficult to believe it when we read our Edwards.

Edwards proceeds to further explanations: Materialist philosophy is unable to solve the problems of psychology, such as pains, pleasures, sensations, perceptions, and thoughts: these are not material things. Leaving aside the question as to what other sensations exist beyond pains and pleasures we pass on to *the* distinction in parentheses: *Note the difference between matter and reality.* This is pretty good for a Dietzgen student! Dietzgen says: "Understanding is material," p. 376. "It is sufficient to point out that the function of the heart and of the brain both belong to the same class, no matter whether this class be called material, real, physical, or what not. So long as language has not established a definite meaning for these terms, all of them serve equally well and are equally deceptive," p. 378. "Things are ideas, ideas are names, and things, ideas, and names are subject to continuous perfection," p. 444. He was mistaken. Perfection (and therefore fixity) has been reached—by our friend Edwards. "In Monism I find a bridge over the chasm between the subjective and the objective." It is as well that Edwards should look to the supports of the bridge—it appears shaky. Even Comrade Craik's quotation appears new to him, yet he will find it in Pannekoek's preface to Dietzgen's *Positive Outcome of Philosophy*, p. 28, with the other quotations from Dietzgen in this letter.

So far Ebby's letter. Now let me again make use of Plechanoff's critique—his quotation from Marx—for reply:—"With Hegel the logical process, which under the name of ideas, turns into a real subject, is the demiurg of reality, which in turn is the external phenomenon. With me it is just the contrary. The ideal is material transferred to the human brain and there perfected." Or from the English translation of *Capital*, vol. i, preface, p. xxx: "My dialectical method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the idea,' he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos [the world-builder and maker] of the real world, and the real world is only the external phenomenal form of 'the idea.' With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought." These quotations define the Marxian materialistic theory of self-consciousness—materialist dialectics. And it is this theory of cognition which, as Engels says, Dietzgen discovered independently of Marx and himself, but later than them, as is quite clear from the earlier writings of Marx and Engels, and the date of Dietzgen's publications. Edwards is evidently of the opinion that Dietzgen's method of investigation is not materialist dialectics, in this he finds no authority from such writers as Marx, Engels, Plechanoff and Pannekoek. Dietzgen himself says: "It is true that the mind alone discovers the imperceptible and abstract generality, *but* it does so *only* within the circle of certain given sense perceptions. The understanding of *the general dependence of the faculty of thought on material sense perceptions* will restore to objective reality that right which has long been denied to it by ideas and opinions," p. 119. The similarity between this quotation and that of Marx's quoted above will be apparent to all.

My main contention was, and is, that the theory of self-consciousness, as propounded by Dietzgen, adds no new principle to proletarian science as propounded by Marx. *That* I believe should be clear to any student of Marx. Dietzgen has developed the theory, just as Labriola, Kautsky, and others have developed the theory of the Materialist Conception of History, Dietzgen having the advantage over the others of having independently discovered his theory. With a final quotation, from Pannekoek's preface to Dietzgen's work above mentioned, I leave the matter to the judgment of your readers. Pannekoek says :

"This modern world-philosophy being a socialist or proletarian one, takes issue with the bourgeois conceptions ; it was *first* conceived as a new view of the world, entirely opposite to the bourgeois conceptions, by Marx and Engels, who *developed* its sociological and historical contents ; its philosophical basis is here *developed* by Dietzgen ; its real character is indicated by the terms dialectic and materialist," p. 30. The italics are mine.

Yours for relative truth, L. BRUMAIRE.

Report

The Mersey District Branch of the Central Labour College

UNDER the above name a group of classes has been formed, with Mr. Nun Nicholas, S.W.M.F., as tutor, for a course of studies in Economics. Last winter Mr. Craik conducted a class in Industrial History in St. Helens, in connexion with his classes at Rochdale. It was felt desirable to work in a smaller area this year, and save a lot of railway fares. So Mr. Jack Burt, Hon. Gen. Sec., of St. Helens Socialist Society, having secured the promise of a tutor if classes could be formed, set to work. Letters, visits, chats and lectures resulted in classes at Wigan, Warrington, Birkenhead, Liverpool (Kensington) and Ashton-in-Wakefield. St. Helens has 50 students, Birkenhead 35, and the others a minimum of 25 each, with expectations of increased membership by the time this appears in print,

I have not been to see the classes in session, so I cannot say much as to their composition, except that in each case they are attached to and are housed by Socialist Societies. At St. Helens however, we have 10 members of the local Labour Party Executive, including two Councillors, one ex-Councillor, three ex-candidates for the Council, members of Labour Clubs, Trade Unions, and the Women's Labour League, as well as members of the Socialist Society. Here side by side sit political Labourists and anti-Labourists, and even men from rival clubs, eagerly listening to the "tale unfolded" of exploitation and economic wrong, of social evolution and social salvation. Here Christian and Atheist, Catholic, Anglican and

Nonconformist with one consent "hear the words of the gospel," the gospel that alone will inspire working-class solidarity and enthuse the wage-slave class with hope and courage to revolt against our oppressors.

The classes are delighted with the tutor, and he is delighted with them. *They* write, "Nicholas is splendid"—"The tutor is grand"—"Just what we want." *He* says, "There are some fine fellows in all the classes, keen and sharp, able and earnest. I am very pleased with them."

We have every reason to look forward to great results from the present studies of the Mersey Branch Classes. The Central Labour College has come not a day too soon, but if only the workers will develop local classes in *all* industrial centres, the day is not far distant when the subject class will be able to dictate terms to their fallen masters.

JACK BURT.

Jules and I

6.30 p.m.

MANY people experience a difficulty in accepting certain Marxian principles because it cannot be clearly shown that Conditions change into Ideas.

Paradoxically they will oppose an Insurance Bill and ignore the resignation of Balfour. Writing, the function of the hand, is often the terminus of condition-produced ideas, and even our most backward brother will recognize the power of writing on a cheque under favourable conditions of industrial development. Do conditions produce ideas?

8 p.m.

Dinner has just finished and I'm back in my study with a half-box of 'weeds,' those kind which spring up and ease the tares (fears) in one's nervous structure. Dinner is a divine institution and helps one to keep up the theory of one's own value. To-night reminded me of those dinners we had at the Randolph in the early days, when we slept on the floor at the C.L.C. hostel. Egad!

I was in Fleet Street sometime ago and near the Law Courts. Notice how my arguments are converging upon the point that conditions produce ideas; Fleet Street and the Law Courts are powerful stimuli. I met Jules Benedick. He was sauntering along clad in a fur-lined Ulster topped by a midget Homburg and wearing an air of general abstraction, latest cut, real Dietzgen. Jules and I have often been taken for twin brothers. We're not members of the same gens although we've known each other since we were able to avail ourselves of the Theory of Cognition. The recognition was mutual. We acceded to the chemical invitation from the A.B.C. opposite, where we indulged in coffee and scones and a chat.

The information elicited from Jules was that he had been doing research work in the British Museum, in the reading rooms, not in other people's pockets. He candidly confessed that he had come under the German and Jewish influence which claimed the economic as the moving factor in history. In contradiction to that theory he had discovered the moving factors were heels; the higher the heels the further was the insight into future development. He too, like those who had preceded him, had abandoned the Tregelian and Marxian conclusions although he had retained the revolutionary method of thought developed by Bill Adams, namely, "The Liedirectre." He found that quality changed to quantity, leather units to wood duplicates, and had proved conclusively that the revolving rubber heel was the re-actionary element in "rubbergeois" society. This thesis held good from the bare heel of the savage to the heel of La Belle Sauvage. When analysing still further in modern society he had received a setback by a growing use of sandals. After arduous research this had been overcome. The atrophy of the heel as an acquired characteristic was due to a policy of non-resistance and the tendency to rest on one's heels. Although he had come to the conclusions above stated with regard to sandals, which was apparently a great contradiction to his theory, he forecasted that the germs of future heel development lay in the use of sandals and that the Darwinian and Spencerian laws would exert their influences. In substantiating the claims of his hypothesis he pointed out that if sandal wearing were transferred further North it would be revolutionary and would result in the polarization of thought and ultimately the polar method of thinking. He said the heel of Achilles was a social truth. The vulnerable spot in society was the socially necessary heel. Here Jules paused for a drink of coffee and prepared for his Franklinean peroration, but the coffee was too hot or took the wrong turning and he gasped "When conditions have so far developed, impelled by the exhaustion of the coal supply, my theory will be a scientific fact." "And thus speaking sheathed the good sword by his side," my umbrella I mean, and stalked from the room and left me to pay. He had come under the sway of capitalist credit. I did not see him until some time after when we again met at the Psychic Club's Annual Dinner, where we discussed the MS., portions of which have already appeared in December number of "*Plebs*" and the advisability of further publication of scientific and social laws in a tabloid form.

MEREDITH F. TITTERINGTON.